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ABSTRACT
A representative-consumer model with Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and i.i.d. shocks, including rare
disasters, accords with key asset-pricing observations.  If the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals
3-4, the model accords with observed equity premia and risk-free real interest rates.  If the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is greater than one, an increase in uncertainty lowers the price-dividend ratio
for equity, whereas a rise in the expected growth rate raises this ratio.  In a model with endogenous
saving, more uncertainty lowers the saving ratio (because substitution effects dominate).  The match
with major features of asset pricing suggests that the model is a reasonable candidate for assessing
the welfare cost of aggregate consumption uncertainty.  In the baseline simulation, the welfare cost
of disaster risk is large -- society would be willing to lower real GDP by as much as 20% each year
to eliminate the small chance of major economic collapses.  The welfare cost from usual economic
fluctuations is much smaller, though still important, corresponding to lowering GDP by around 1.5%
each year.
Robert J. Barro
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and NBER
rbarro@harvard.edu  In a previous study, Barro (2006), I used the Rietz (1988) idea of rare economic 
disasters to explain the equity premium and related asset-pricing puzzles.  My 
quantitative examination of large macroeconomic contractions in 35 countries during the 
20
th century suggested a disaster probability of roughly 2% per year.  The size 
distribution of GDP contractions during these events ranged between 15% (the arbitrary 
lower bound) and over 60%.  A simple representative-agent economy, calibrated to 
accord with this disaster experience, can explain an equity premium of around 4-6% and 
a risk-free real interest rate of about 1-2%.  With power-utility preferences, these results 
require a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3-4.  The analysis applies in a Lucas-tree 
economy with i.i.d. production shocks or to an “AK model” with endogenous saving and 
stochastic depreciation. 
  The present analysis extends the framework to consider additional aspects of asset 
pricing and to assess the welfare cost of consumption uncertainty.  As observed by 
Bansal and Yaron (2004), power-utility preferences with a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion above one generate two implausible predictions.  First, an increase in 
uncertainty raises the price-dividend ratio for equities, and second, a rise in the mean 
growth rate lowers the price-dividend ratio.  More reasonable predictions require an 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) above one.  However, in the power-utility 
framework, this property conflicts with a coefficient of relative risk aversion greater than 
one—a condition needed to match observed equity premia and risk-free rates.  Therefore, 
to fit a broad set of asset-pricing “facts,” it is essential to use a preference specification, 
such as that of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990), that de-links the IES from the   2 
 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Power utility, although attractive for its simplicity, 
cannot work. 
  The framework is still a representative-consumer model with i.i.d. shocks to 
production.  In this setting, the key asset-pricing conditions under Epstein-Zin-Weil 
(henceforth, EZW) preferences resemble those with power utility.  However, two key 
differences emerge.  First, under EZW preferences, consumption enters into asset-pricing 
formulas with an exponent that involves the coefficient of relative risk aversion, not the 
IES.  Second, the formulas involve an effective rate of time preference, denoted ρ*, that 
deviates from the usual rate of time preference, ρ, when the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion is unequal to the reciprocal of the IES.  The value of ρ* depends on ρ, the IES, 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and the other parameters of the model—including 
parameters that describe expected growth and uncertainty. 
  With i.i.d. shocks, the EZW framework ends up as simple as the power-utility 
setting, and it accords with a broader set of asset-pricing facts.  First, when calibrated to 
the observed frequency and size distribution of macroeconomic disasters, the model can 
explain the equity premium and risk-free rate, still with a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion of 3-4.  Second, with an IES above one, the model predicts that an increase in 
uncertainty lowers the dividend-price ratio, whereas a rise in the expected growth rate 
raises this ratio.  Third, in an AK model that allows for endogenous saving, the IES above 
one implies that more uncertainty lowers the saving ratio (because substitution effects 
dominate when the IES exceeds one). 
  Lucas (1987, Ch. 3; 2003, section II) argued that the welfare gain from 
eliminating aggregate consumption uncertainty is trivial.  One problem with his   3 
 
calculation, apparent from Mehra and Prescott (1985), is that simulations with Lucas’s 
model do not get into the right ballpark for explaining the high equity premium and low 
risk-free rate.  These failures with respect to asset returns suggest, as observed by 
Atkeson and Phelan (1994), that the model misses important aspects of consumption 
uncertainty.  Hence, the model’s estimates of welfare effects from aggregate consumption 
uncertainty are unlikely to be accurate. 
  A reasonable principle is that analyses of the impacts of consumption uncertainty 
should be carried out within models that at least roughly replicate the way that asset 
markets price this uncertainty.  This Atkeson-Phelan principle was followed by Alvarez 
and Jermann (2004) and is also adopted in the present paper.  In my case, the prospects of 
rare economic disasters, as in Rietz (1988), are critical for matching asset-pricing facts.  
Within this setting, changes in consumption uncertainty that reflect shifts in the 
probability of disaster have major implications for welfare.  Individuals would willingly 
relinquish as much as 20% of GDP each year in exchange for eliminating all chances for 
macroeconomic disaster. The welfare cost from usual economic fluctuations is much 
smaller, though still important—corresponding to lowering GDP by around 1.5% each 
year. 
  Section I works out the Lucas-tree model with rare disasters.  The key asset-
pricing formulas under EZW preferences are derived here.  Section II computes welfare 
costs within this model; first for marginal changes in uncertainty and then for large 
changes.  Section III discusses the sensitivity of the welfare-cost calculations to the 
choices of the two key preference parameters:  the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  Section IV allows for endogenous labor   4 
 
supply—one point here is that any wage elasticity of labor supply is compatible with a 
given coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Section V includes endogenous saving and 
investment and shows how adjustments of saving affect welfare costs.  Section VI 
concludes by emphasizing the effects of policies and institutions on disaster probabilities 
and sizes. 
 
I.  A Lucas Fruit-Tree Model 
The initial model is a version of Lucas’s (1978) representative-agent, fruit-tree 
economy with exogenous, stochastic production.  Output of fruit in period t equals real 
GDP, Yt.  Population is constant.  The number of trees is fixed; that is, there is neither 
investment nor depreciation.  (The model in section IV allows for investment.)  
Government purchases are nil.  Since the economy is closed and all output is consumed, 
consumption, Ct, equals Yt. 
The log of output evolves as a random walk with drift: 
(1)   log(Yt+1) = log(Yt) + g + ut+1 + vt+1. 
The random term ut+1 is i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and variance σ
2.  This term reflects 
“normal” economic fluctuations.  The parameter g ≥ 0 is a constant that reflects 
exogenous productivity growth.   
  The random term vt+1 in Eq. (1) picks up low-probability disasters, as in Rietz 
(1988) and Barro (2006).  In these rare events, output and consumption jump down 
sharply.  The probability of a disaster is the constant p ≥ 0 per unit of time.  The 
probability of more than one disaster in a period is assumed to be small enough to   5 
 
neglect; later, the arbitrary period length shrinks to zero.  In a disaster, output contracts 
by the fraction b, where 0<b<1.  The distribution of vt+1 is given by 
   probability  1-p:    vt+1 = 0, 
   probability  p:    vt+1 = log(1-b). 
The disaster size, b, follows some probability distribution (gauged subsequently by the 
empirical distribution of disaster sizes). 
  Unlike Lucas (1987, Ch. 3), but in line with Obstfeld (1994), the shocks ut+1 and 
vt+1 in Eq. (1) represent permanent effects on the level of output, rather than transitory 
disturbances to the level.  That is, the economy has no tendency to revert to a 
deterministic trend line. 
  Cochrane (1988, Table 1) used variance-ratio statistics for k-year differences to 
assess the extent of reversion to a deterministic trend in the log of U.S. real per capita 
GNP for 1869-1986.  He found evidence for reversion in that the ratio of the k-year 
variance (divided by k) to the 1-year variance was between 0.30 and 0.36 for k between 
20 and 30 years.  Therefore, at large k, the empirical variance ratio was much less than 
the value 1.0 predicted by Eq. (1).  However, Cogley (1990, Table 2) showed that the 
Cochrane finding was particular to the United States.  For 9 OECD countries, including 
the United States, from 1871 to 1985, the mean of the variance ratio at 20 years was 1.1; 
hence, close to the value 1.0 predicted by Eq. (1). 
  Cogley’s results hold up for a broader sample comprising 19 OECD countries.  
The data on per capita GDP are for 1870-2005 from Maddison (2003), updated from 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (and using U.S. data from Balke and Gordon 
[1989] before 1929).  For k=20, the mean of the variance ratios for the 19 countries is   6 
 
1.22 and the median is 1.00, while for k=30, the corresponding values are 1.30 and 0.96.  
These values accord with Eq. (1).  The United States—with variance ratios of 0.42 when 
k=20 and 0.38 when k=30—has the lowest ratios at these values of k among the 19 
countries.
1  The critical factor for the United States is that the turbulence of the Great 
Depression and World War II happened to be followed by the log of per capita GDP 
reverting roughly to the pre-1930 and pre-1914 trend lines.  Most other countries do not 
look like this. 
  My inference from the long-term GDP data for the OECD countries is that the 
evidence conflicts strongly with reversion to a fixed, deterministic trend.   The key, 
counter-factual prediction from this model is the comparatively low uncertainty about the 
distant future.  In contrast, the variance-ratio results are consistent with the stochastic-
trend specification in Eq. (1).  Therefore, I use this model for the present analysis.  Richer 
models of GDP and consumption that I am currently studying (in joint work with Emi 
Nakamura, Jon Steinsson, and Jose Ursua) allow for trend breaks (analyzed starting from 
Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock [1992]) and for gradual reversion to past levels after 
major disasters, such as destructive wars and financial crises. 
  Previous research (Barro [2006, Table 1 and Figure 1]) gauged the probability and 
size distribution of disaster events from time series on per capita real GDP for 35 
countries for the full 20
th century.
2  In the main empirical analysis, that study defined a 
                                                 
1 The next smallest values for k=20 are 0.55 for New Zealand, 0.68 for Germany, and 0.77 for Switzerland.  
At k=30, the next smallest values are 0.40 for New Zealand, 0.53 for Germany, and 0.54 for Canada.  For 
smaller values of k, the mean and median of the variance ratios are, respectively, 1.16 and 1.18 at k=2, 1.23 
and 1.31 at k=5, and 1.13 and 1.06 at k=10.  The U.S. ratios at these values of k are, respectively, 1.30, 
1.34, and 0.94. 
2The GDP data were from Maddison (2003).  In the fruit-tree model, GDP and consumption coincide.  
More generally, consumption would be more appropriate than GDP for analyses of asset pricing and 
welfare costs.  However, long-term data on real consumer expenditure are not reported by Maddison and 
are not readily available for many countries.  An ongoing research project, described in Barro and Ursua   7 
 
macroeconomic disaster as a decline in per capita real GDP by at least 15% over 
consecutive years (such as 1939-44 for France and 1929-33 for the United States).  These 
kinds of events are rare—only 60 cases were found in the long-term experiences of the 35 
countries; that is, less than 2 per country.
3  Therefore, to use history to gauge the 
probability and size distribution of macroeconomic disasters, it is hopeless to rely on the 
experience of a single country, such as the United States, even if we are willing to assume 
that the U.S. economic structure remained fixed for 100 years or more.
4  In contrast, in 
long time series for a broad international sample, enough disaster realizations are 
available to allow for reasonably accurate inferences about disaster probabilities and size 
distributions.  Underlying this calculation, of course, is the assumption that the 
underlying probability distributions are reasonably similar across countries, as well as 
roughly stable over time. 
  For the 35 countries, the main global disasters were World War II (18 countries 
with large GDP contractions), the Great Depression (16 countries), World War I (13 
countries), and post-World War II depressions in Latin America and Asia (11 country-
events).  The empirical frequency—60 events for 35 countries over 100 years—
corresponds to a disaster probability, p, of 1.7% per year.  (The disasters need not be 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2008), involves the assembly of a data set on long-term real personal consumer expenditure for as many 
countries as possible. 
3 The 60 cases exclude 5 post-war GDP contractions that did not involve large declines in real personal 
consumer expenditure.  The lower limit of 15% is arbitrary.  Extending to 10% brings in another 21 
contractions for the 35 countries.  However, the inclusion of these smaller contractions has a minor effect 
on the results. 
4 Chatterjee and Corbae (2007) use the U.S. history of the unemployment rate to note (p. 1534) that there is 
“only one depression episode in the sample.”  From these data—and an assumption of unchanged economic 
structure since 1900—they infer a probability of moving from normalcy to depression of once every 83 
years.  This probability and the size distribution of depressions cannot be gauged accurately from this one 
time series.  Moreover, they assume without discussion that real GDP always reverts to a deterministic 
trend line, although, as already noted, Cogley’s (1990) and other analyses indicate that the data for most 
countries strongly reject this hypothesis.  Salyer’s (2007) analysis is similar in spirit to Chatterjee and 
Corbae’s.   8 
 
independent across countries; in fact, they tend to congregate into events such as world 
wars, the Great Depression, the Asian financial crisis, and the Latin American debt 
crisis.) 
The contraction proportion b for the observed 20
th century disasters ranged from 
15% to 64%, with a mean of 29%.
5  However, with substantial risk aversion, the effective 
average value of b is substantially above the mean.  For example, with a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion of 4, a constant b of around 40% generates about the same equity 
premium and welfare effects as the empirically observed frequency distribution of b. 
The formulation neglects rare bonanzas.  With substantial risk aversion, bonanzas 
do not count nearly as much as disasters for the pricing of assets and for welfare effects.  
Moreover, long-term data on annual growth rates of per capita GDP tend to exhibit 
negative skewness.  For 19 OECD countries from 1880 to 2005, 14 exhibit negative 
skewness, and the only substantially positive values are for France, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. 
  The expected growth rate of real GDP depends not only on the growth-rate 
parameter, g, but also on the uncertainty parameters.  As the length of the period 
approaches zero, the specification in Eq. (1) implies that the expected growth rate of GDP 
and consumption, denoted by g*, is given by 
(2)      g* = g + (1/2)σ
2 – p·Eb, 
where Eb is the expected value of b—0.29 in the sample of 60 observed crises.  In 
practice, the term (1/2)σ
2 tends to be negligible—0.0002 in the calibrations considered 
later, for which σ=0.02.  However, the term p·Eb is not trivial—0.0049 when p=0.017 
                                                 
5 The 29% figure refers to raw levels of per capita GDP.  With an adjustment for trend growth, the mean 
contraction size was 35%.   9 
 
and Eb=0.29.  In this case, g=0.025 corresponds to g*=0.020, the value used in the main 
calibrations. 
I start with the familiar formulation where the representative consumer maximizes 
a time-additive utility function with iso-elastic preferences: 
(3)   ) 1 /( ] 1 ) [(
) 1 (
1 1
0 γ
ρ
γ − − ⋅
+
=
−
+
∞
= ∑ i t i i t t C E U , 
where ρ≥0 is the rate of time preference.  As is well known, this power-utility 
specification implies that the key parameter γ>0 represents both the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion and the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, henceforth 
labeled IES.  This restriction matters for welfare-cost calculations, as observed by 
Obstfeld (1994), and also generates predictions about asset prices that are probably 
counter-factual, as argued by Bansal and Yaron (2004).  Therefore, I soon generalize the 
preference formulation to the setting of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990), in which 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is de-linked from the IES. 
  Asset prices and rates of return can be determined in the usual way from the first-
order conditions for consumption over time.  With the power-utility formulation from 
Eq. (3), the familiar first-order conditions are 
 (4)     ) ( )
1
1
( 1
γ γ
ρ
−
+
− ⋅ ⋅
+
= t t t t C R E C , 
where Rt is the gross return on any asset from time t to time t+1. 
  A key variable is the market value, V, of a tree that initially produces one unit of 
fruit.  One way to calculate this value is to sum the prices of equity claims on future 
“dividends,” Ct+i =Yt+i.  (In order to correspond to the summation in Eq. [3], it is 
convenient to treat Ct, rather than Ct+1, as the first payout on tree equity.)  These prices   10 
 
can be determined readily from Eq. (4).  As the arbitrary period length approaches zero, 
the reciprocal of V turns out to be 
  (5)   1/V = ρ + (γ-1)·g* – (1/2)·γ·(γ-1)·σ
2 – p·[E(1-b)
1-γ – 1 – (γ-1)·Eb], 
where g* is the expected growth rate (of dividends) from Eq. (2), E(1-b)
1-γ is the 
expectation of (1-b)
1-γ, and Eb is the expectation of b.  The variable V corresponds to the 
price-dividend ratio for an unlevered equity claim on a tree. 
  Given the pricing formula in Eq. (5), the expected rate of return on unlevered 
equity can be determined (when the period length approaches zero) to be 
 (6)   r
e = ρ + γg* - (1/2)·γ·(γ-1)·σ
2 - p·[E(1-b)
1-γ - 1 - (γ-1)·Eb]. 
Therefore, the right-hand side of Eq. (5) is the difference between r
e and g*.  The 
transversality condition, which guarantees that the market value of a tree is positive and 
finite, is that this right-hand side be positive; that is, r
e>g*. 
  The risk-free interest rate, r
f, can also be determined from Eq. (4).  The result 
(when the period length approaches zero) is 
 (7)   r
f = ρ + γg* - (1/2)·γ·(γ+1)·σ
2 - p·[E(1-b)
-γ - 1 - γ·Eb]. 
(Since the model has i.i.d. shocks, the term structure of risk-free rates is flat; that is, r
f is 
the short-term and long-term risk-free rate.)  Depending on the uncertainty parameters—
particularly p and the distribution of b—r
f can be very low.  In fact, r
f can be less than g* 
and even less than zero.  The equity premium is 
 (8)   r
e - r
f = γσ
2 + p·[ E(1-b)
-γ - E(1-b)
1-γ - Eb] . 
  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show average real rates of return on stocks and 
government bills from 1880 to 2005 for 11 OECD countries that have the necessary long-
term data.  The equity premium, in the sense of the difference between the two average   11 
 
rates of return, is 0.065 per year.  Since the stock returns reflect leverage, the premium 
for unlevered equity would be smaller.  For example, with a debt-equity ratio of 0.5 
(corresponding to recent U.S. values), the premium would be around 0.043. 
  For the model to get into the right ballpark for explaining the equity premium, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, has to be well above one.  Barro (2006) showed, 
for plausible values of the uncertainty parameters, especially p and the distribution of b, 
that γ=4 was satisfactory.
6  In any event, γ could not be less than about 3. 
  One difficulty is that, if γ>1, Eq. (5) delivers the likely counter-factual prediction 
that an increase in uncertainty (higher σ or p or a shift in the distribution of b toward 
larger values), for given g*, implies a higher price-dividend ratio, V.  Bansal and Yaron 
(2004, p. 1487) make an analogous observation about the connection between the 
volatility of consumption growth and the price-dividend ratio in their model.  The 
prediction for a positive relationship between the extent of uncertainty and the price-
dividend ratio conflicts with the usual view that an increase in aggregate uncertainty 
tends to depress stock prices.  The reason that the model makes this counter-intuitive 
prediction is that, with power utility, the IES is constrained to equal the reciprocal of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Therefore, I now relax this restriction (as do Bansal 
and Yaron [2004]) by adopting the preference specification of Epstein and Zin (1989) 
and Weil (1990). 
  Using a minor modification of the Weil (1990) formulation, the extended utility 
formula is  
 (10)  {}
) 1 )( 1 (
] ) 1 )( 1 [( ) 1 (
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 (
1
1
γ β
γ β β β
θ γ γ θ θ
− −
− − + −
=
− − − −
+
−
t t t
t
U E C
U , 
                                                 
6 That analysis also took account of partial default on bills, typically due to high wartime inflation.   12 
 
where the discount factor β equals 1/(1+ρ), 1/θ > 0 is the IES, and γ>0 is the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion.  Equation (3) is the special case of Eq. (10) when θ=γ. 
  In general, EZW preferences do not allow for simple formulas for pricing assets.  
However, when the underlying shocks are i.i.d., as already assumed, the analysis 
simplifies dramatically.  A key property of the solution under i.i.d. shocks is that attained 
utility, Ut, ends up as a simple function of contemporaneous consumption, Ct: 
 ( 1 1 )      U t = ΦCt
1-γ, 
where the constant Φ depends on the parameters of the model.
7   
  The application of a standard perturbation argument to Eq. (11) implies that the 
first-order conditions for utility maximization can be expressed as 
 (12)     ) ( )
* 1
1
( 1
γ γ
ρ
−
+
− ⋅ ⋅
+
= t t t t C R E C , 
where Rt is the gross, one-period return on any asset.  As usual, these first-order 
conditions will be the basis for asset pricing.  Thus, an important result is that, with i.i.d. 
shocks, the conditions for asset pricing under EZW preferences look similar to those in 
the power-utility model, described by Eq. (4).  However, two key features of the EZW 
results are worth stressing.  First, the exponents on Ct and Ct+1 in Eq. (12) involve γ, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, not θ, the reciprocal of the IES.  Second, the effective 
rate of time preference, ρ*, differs from ρ when γ and θ diverge.  The formula for ρ* is, if 
γ≠1, 
                                                 
7 Giovannini and Weil (1989, appendix) show that, with the utility function in Eq. (10), attained utility, Ut, 
is proportional to wealth raised to the power 1-γ.  The form in Eq. (11) follows because Ct is optimally 
chosen as a constant ratio to wealth in the i.i.d. case.  The formula for Φ is, if γ≠1 and θ≠1, 
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In this and subsequent cases, results when γ (or, subsequently, θ) approach one can be 
derived from standard limit calculations.  Note from Eq. (13) that ρ* depends not only on 
preference parameters—ρ, γ, and θ—but also on parameters that describe expected 
growth and uncertainty—g*, σ, p, and the distribution of b. 
  The results imply that, in the i.i.d. case, asset-pricing formulas derived under 
EZW preferences coincide with formulas under power utility if ρ* replaces ρ.  In 
particular, the formulas for V, r
e, and r
f in Eqs. (5)-(7) remain valid with the substitution 
of ρ* for ρ.  Therefore, in the EZW case, the IES, 1/θ, affects the price-dividend ratio 
(Eq. [5]) and levels of rates of return (Eqs. [6] and [7])—through influences on ρ*—but 
not the equity premium (Eq. [8]).  The equity premium depends on the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, γ, exactly in the way as in the power-utility case.  Since the power-
utility model accorded reasonably well with observed equity premia when γ=4, it follows 
that the EZW specification fits the equity premium just as well when γ=4. 
  With EZW preferences, the formula for the price-dividend ratio, V, in Eq. (5) 
becomes, after replacement of ρ by ρ* from Eq. (13), 
(14)  ] ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( [ )
1
1
( ) 1 ( ) 2 / 1 ( * ) 1 ( / 1
1 2 Eb b E p g V ⋅ − − − − ⋅
−
−
⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − + =
− γ
γ
θ
σ θ γ θ ρ
γ , 
if γ≠1.  For any γ>0, the condition θ<1 implies that, with g* held fixed, V is lower if 
uncertainty is greater (higher σ or p or a shift of the b-distribution toward higher values).
8 
                                                 
8 These results apply when the price-dividend ratio, V, pertains to unlevered equity.  We can instead 
consider levered equity, as in Barro (2006, section III).  The relation between uncertainty and the price of 
levered equity can be negative even if θ>1.  The condition for increased σ to reduce the levered equity price 
is θ < 1 + 2λ, where λ is the debt-equity ratio for claims on trees.  For increased p, the condition depends on 
the distribution of disaster sizes, b, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ.  For the baseline 
specification with γ=4 and the historical distribution of b, the condition is θ < 1 + 3.6·λ.   14 
 
  Equation (14) also implies, if θ<1, that V is higher if the mean growth rate, g*, is 
higher (for given uncertainty parameters).  This condition is important in Bansal and 
Yaron (2004), who propose to explain the equity premium not by disaster risk but rather 
by shocks to their counterpart of g*.  They also allow for a time-varying variance of these 
shocks.  One limitation of their approach is that quantitative success depends on very 
high risk aversion.  The coefficient γ has to be around 10 to account for observed equity 
premia in their model.  Thus, my inference is that fluctuating long-run growth rates, g*, 
may usefully supplement analyses that include disaster risk but probably cannot be the 
main basis for explaining the equity premium. 
  Given the GDP process in Eq. (1), data on rates of return, such as r
e and r
f, and the 
price-dividend ratio, V, pin down γ and the effective rate of time preference, ρ*.  Since 
ρ* depends on a combination of ρ and θ (in Eq. [13]), the data would not allow separate 
identification of ρ and θ, a finding that relates to the observational-equivalence point of 
Kocherlakota (1990).  However, the parameters ρ and θ could be separately identified 
from other information; for example, if we know how V responds to changes in the 
uncertainty parameters—σ, p, and the distribution of b—or the expected growth rate, g*, 
in Eq. (14).  Alternatively, in the model with endogenous saving considered in section IV, 
identification would follow from information about how the saving ratio reacts to 
changes in σ, p, and the distribution of b. 
  To summarize, the model with Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences, disaster risk, and 
i.i.d. shocks can accord with some central asset-pricing “facts.”  First, if the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, γ, is around 4, the equity premium and risk-free rate can be roughly 
correct.  Second, if θ<1, so that the IES is greater than 1, the price-dividend ratio, V,   15 
 
relates to aggregate uncertainty and expected growth in the “right” directions—more 
uncertainty goes along with lower V and higher expected growth goes along with 
higher V. 
  The simplicity of the underlying structure (i.i.d. shocks, representative consumer, 
closed economy with no investment) allows for a closed-form solution for attained utility, 
Ut, as a function of the underlying parameters of preferences and the output process.  
Obstfeld (1994) derived analogous closed forms in a model without disaster risk.  A 
convenient representation uses Eqs. (5) and (11) to express Ut as a function of the price-
dividend ratio, V.  The formula, when γ≠1 and θ≠1, is, up to an inconsequential additive 
constant:
9 
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Equation (15), in conjunction with Eq. (14), allows for assessments of the welfare effects 
of uncertainty. 
 
II.  Calculation of Welfare Effects 
  Equations (14) and (15) determine the dependence of attained utility, Ut, on the 
expected growth rate, g*, and the parameters that govern consumption risk:  σ, p, and the 
distribution of b.  These effects can be compared with those from proportionate shifts in 
the initial level of GDP and consumption, Yt. 
 
                                                 
9 The form of Eq. (15) does not depend on the particular stochastic process for output in Eq. (1).  However, 
the constancy of the price-dividend ratio, Vt=V, depends on the i.i.d. form of the shocks, ut and vt.  A 
constant V conflicts with the observed volatility of price-dividend ratios for stock-market claims.  The 
model can match this volatility if the parameters of uncertainty, such as the disaster probability, pt, move 
around.  Gabaix (2006) shows that the main implications of the model for asset pricing go through if pt 
evolves exogenously in random-walk-like fashion.   16 
 
  a.  Local effects on welfare 
  The marginal effect on utility from a proportionate change in Yt is given from 
Eq. (15) by 
  (16)              
γ θ γ θ γ θ ρ
− − − − − ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅
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t
t Y V Y
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U
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The marginal effect from a change in g* follows from Eqs. (14) and (15) as 
  (17)           
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Therefore, the utility rate of transformation between proportionate changes in Yt and 
changes in g* is given by 
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This result gives the proportionate decrease in Yt that compensates, at the margin, for an 
increase in g*—in the sense of preserving attained utility.  Equation (18) shows that this 
compensating output change depends only on the combination of parameters that enter 
into the price-dividend ratio, V, determined in Eq. (14). 
  To pin down a reasonable magnitude for V, start with the already mentioned 
specification p=0.017 per year.  This and subsequent calibration parameters are collected 
in Table 1.  The probability distribution for b is the historical one mentioned before, for 
which Eb=0.29.  Some other baseline parameters are the same as those used in the main 
calibration exercise in Barro (2006, Table 5).  The coefficient of relative risk aversion is 
γ=4, the standard deviation of the ut shocks is σ=0.020 per year, the growth-rate 
parameter is g=0.025 per year, and the expected growth rate is g*=0.020 per year (from   17 
 
Eq. [2]).
10  Since this earlier exercise assumed power-utility preferences, where θ=γ, the 
IES, 1/θ, was constrained to be 0.25—as already mentioned, an IES this low produces 
implausible results concerning the link between uncertainty parameters and the price-
dividend ratio.  The EZW case now being considered requires a separate calibration for 
the IES. 
  Macroeconomic estimates of the IES, 1/θ, represented by Hall (1988), come from 
regressions of consumption growth rates on real rates of return, for example, on short-
term real interest rates.  The resulting estimates of 1/θ cover a broad range and are 
typically well below one.  However, as observed by Bansal and Yaron (2004, p. 1501) 
and Barro (2005, section VIII), these coefficient estimates tend to be biased sharply 
toward zero because sample fluctuations in real interest rates likely reflect, to a 
considerable extent, variations in uncertainty parameters.  This regression approach with 
macroeconomic data yields satisfactory estimates of 1/θ only if the fluctuations in real 
interest rates stem mainly from movements in the expected growth rate, g*, for given 
uncertainty parameters. 
  Because of the shortcomings of macroeconomic estimates of the IES, it is 
worthwhile to consider microeconomic evidence.  The Gruber (2006) analysis is 
particularly attractive because it uses cross-individual differences in after-tax real interest 
rates that derive from arguably exogenous differences in tax rates on capital income.  For 
                                                 
10 The values for g and σ come from data on real personal consumer expenditure for 21 OECD countries for 
1954-2005, a tranquil period with no disaster events for these countries.  The largest contraction was 14% 
for per capita real consumer expenditure (12% for per capita GDP) for Finland in 1989-93.  For 1954-2005, 
the median of the growth rates of real per capita personal consumer expenditure for the 21 countries was 
0.026 per year, and the median standard deviation of the growth rates was 0.024.  The U.S. values were 
0.024 and 0.018, respectively.  With γ=4, the expectations associated with the historical distribution of 
disaster sizes, b, are Eb=0.29, E(1-b)
-γ = 7.69, and E(1-b)
1-γ = 4.05.   18 
 
present purposes, the key point is that the Gruber estimate of the IES is around 2.0.  Thus, 
I use θ=0.5 in my baseline calibration. 
  The final parameter needed is the rate of time preference, ρ.  The main 
calibrations in Barro (2006) used ρ=0.030 per year.  However, the pure rate of time 
preference is not directly observable.  Typically, a reasonable value for ρ is inferred by 
considering its connection to levels of rates of return, including the risk-free real interest 
rate.  Thus, a first point is that, in the EZW context, the link to rates of return involves the 
effective rate of time preference, ρ*, given in Eq. (13), not ρ, per se.  Hence, I proceed by 
assuming that ρ takes on a value that, given the other baseline parameters, generates a ρ* 
that yields a plausible risk-free real interest rate. 
  Table 2 shows that the real rate of return on government bills (or analogous short-
term claims) for 11 OECD countries from 1880 to 2005 averaged 0.010 per year.  These 
bill returns are not risk-free and include some very low realizations due to war-related 
inflations (such as in Germany around World War I).  Therefore, risk-free rates (not 
directly observed) would likely be somewhat lower than the average real rate of return on 
bills.  However, I take 0.010 as an approximation to the risk-free rate.  Given the other 
baseline parameters, it turns out that a value ρ*=0.027 is required to generate r
f=0.010 in 
the model (from Eq. [7] with ρ* substituted for ρ).  Equation (13) then implies that the 
required value of ρ is 0.052. 
  The full set of baseline parameters, shown in Table 1, generates a price-dividend 
ratio, V, in Eq. (14) of 20.7.  This value for V implies that a small rise in the expected 
growth rate, g*—for example, by 0.1% per year—has to be compensated by a fall in the 
initial level of GDP, Yt, by 2.1%.  Despite differences in specification, this result accords   19 
 
with the one found by Lucas (1987, Ch. 3, p. 24).  An economy should be willing to give 
up a lot in its initial level of GDP to obtain a small increase in its long-term growth rate. 
  The Lucas calculations about consumption uncertainty relate in the present model 
to the parameter σ.  The marginal effect on attained utility, Ut, from a change in σ is 
given from Eqs. (14) and (15) by 
 (19)    
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Therefore, Eq. (16) implies that the utility rate of transformation between proportionate 
changes in Yt and changes in σ is given by 
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This expression gives the proportionate increase in initial GDP required to compensate, at 
the margin, for a rise in σ.  The parameters specified before imply γσV = 1.66.  
Therefore, to maintain attained utility, an increase in σ by, say, 10% (from 0.020 to 
0.022) requires a rise in the initial level of GDP by approximately 0.33%.  Since the 
expected growth rate, g*, is held fixed, this proportionate rise in GDP level should be 
viewed as applying each year.
11 
  These calculations apply for small changes in σ.  Large changes, considered in the 
next section, recognize that the utility rate of transformation rises with σ on the right-
hand side of Eq. (20).  This consideration means that the welfare gain from reducing σ 
from 0.020 to zero is smaller in magnitude than the amount—3.3%—that would be 
calculated from Eq. (20) if the utility rate of transformation were constant. 
                                                 
11 Obstfeld (1994) observes that Lucas (1987, Ch. 3) gets far smaller estimates for the welfare cost of 
consumption uncertainty because he treats the shock, analogous to ut in the present model, as a transitory 
disturbance to the level of output.   20 
 
  Consider now the welfare consequences from a change in the disaster probability, 
p, for a given distribution of disaster sizes, b.  Equations (14) and (15) imply 
 (21)  ) 1 /( )] 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( [ ) ( ) (
1 2 ) 1 /( ) ( 1 − − ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − =
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t
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This formula applies while holding fixed the expected growth rate, g*; that is, it does not 
allow for the negative effect of p on g*, for given g, in Eq. (2).  The utility rate of 
transformation between proportionate changes in Yt and changes in p is given by 
 (22)    ) 1 /( )] 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( [
) / (
) / ( 1 − − ⋅ − − − ⋅ =
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With the parameter values used before, the right-hand side equals 15.1.  As before, the 
result applies to small changes.  An increase in p by 10% (from 0.0170 to 0.0187) 
matches up approximately with a proportionate rise in initial GDP by 2.6%.  Again, this 
change in GDP level applies each year.   
  We can modify the calculations to allow for a growth effect from a change in p; 
that is, for given g, g* falls with p in Eq. (2).
12  The result modifies Eq. (22) to 
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With the same parameter values as before, the right-hand side equals 21.0.  Therefore, a 
rise in p by 10% now matches up with a proportionate increase in GDP by 3.6%— larger 
than before because of the decline in g*. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Barlevy (2004) for a discussion of models in which uncertainty affects the expected growth rate of 
GDP.   21 
 
  b.  Welfare effects from large changes 
  Equations (18), (20), (22), and (23) assess welfare effects from small changes in 
Yt, g*, σ, and p.  We can instead use Eqs. (14) and (15) to assess the effects on attained 
utility from large changes.  Let V and Yt be the values that apply for the baseline 
specification of parameters in Table 1.  Let V* and (Yt)* be values that apply in an 
alternative situation that delivers the same attained utility, Ut.  Then the formula for Ut in 
Eq. (15) implies
13 
 (24)    (Yt)*/Yt = (V/V*)
1/(1-θ) . 
  The result in Eq. (24) relates to Alvarez and Jermann (2004), who try to go as far 
as possible to gauge the welfare costs of consumption uncertainty by observing or 
estimating various asset prices.
14  Equation (24) provides insight for the present model on 
the extent to which welfare costs can be assessed from observations of asset prices related 
to equity shares.  The price V may be observable—in the Lucas-tree economy, V is the 
price-dividend ratio for an unlevered equity claim on a tree.  However, the price V* is 
unlikely to be observable:  V* is the price-dividend ratio for unlevered tree equity in a 
hypothetical economy, such as one with zero uncertainty.   
  If the hypothetical price-dividend ratio, V*, could be observed or estimated, 
Eq. (24) shows that the welfare gain, measured by the compensating output change 
(Yt)*/Yt, depends on the parameter θ, for given V and V*.   The baseline specification in 
                                                 
13 Equation (24) determines the compensating income change in the sense of Hicks (1946, pp. 330-331) for 
a shift in a parameter, such as g*, σ, or p. 
14Part of the Alvarez-Jermann analysis depends on the pricing of a claim to a “consumption trend.”  The 
price of such a claim is finite only if the risk-free rate, r
f, exceeds the expected growth rate, g*.  This 
condition need not hold in the model; that is r
f<g* can apply in Eq. (7).  Moreover, the data in Table 2 
indicate that the average real rate of return on government bills, 0.010, was below the long-term average 
growth rate for OECD countries.  These growth rates averaged around 0.020 for per capita GDP and 
consumption and 0.030 for levels of GDP and consumption.  Under these circumstances, the price of an 
Alvarez-Jermann consumption-trend claim is infinity.   22 
 
Table 1 uses the value θ=0.5, corresponding to an IES of 2.  For this case, Eq. (24) 
implies an inverse-square law for the relation between the welfare effect and the ratio of 
equity prices: 
 (25)    (Yt)*/Yt = (V/V*)
2 . 
Suppose, for example, that a reduction in uncertainty (a decrease in σ or p or a shift in the 
b-distribution toward smaller values) results in an increase in the price-dividend ratio by 
1%—that is, V* is 1% above V.  In this case, the compensating output change is about 
2%—that is, (Yt)* is roughly 2% below Yt. 
  Lucas (1987, Ch. 3; 2003, section II) focused on the consequences of eliminating 
all consumption uncertainty associated with usual business fluctuations—in the present 
context, this exercise corresponds to setting σ=0.  The formula for V in Eq. (14) implies 
for this case  
1/V* = 1/V + (1/2)·γ·(θ-1)·σ
2. 
Substitution into Eq. (24) yields 
 (26)    (Yt)*/ Yt = [1 + (1/2)·γ·(θ-1)·σ
2V]
1/(1-θ). 
Suppose that the magnitude of (1/2)·γ·(θ-1)·σ
2V is much less than one—a condition likely 
to hold because (1/2)·γ·(θ-1)·σ
2V = -0.0083 in the baseline specification.  In this case, the 
result in Eq. (26) simplifies to  
 (27)    log[(Yt)*/Yt] ≈ -(1/2)·γσ
2V. 
That is, the welfare benefit from reducing σ to zero is approximately one-half the effect 
that would be calculated from the local impact of a change in σ given by Eq. (20).   
  With the parameter values assumed before, Eq. (26) implies that (Yt)* is 1.6% 
below Yt.  That is, society would be willing to give up 1.6% of output each year to   23 
 
eliminate all of the customary economic fluctuations represented by σ.  As noted before 
(n. 11), this effect is much larger than that found by Lucas (1987) mainly because the 
impact of a shock, ut, on the GDP level is permanent in the present model. 
  Setting the disaster probability, p, to zero (or, equivalently, the disaster size, b, to 
zero) has much greater consequences for welfare.  The formula, derived from Eqs. (14) 
and (24), is 
 (28)   
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Note that this formula holds fixed the expected growth rate, g*; that is, it does not allow 
for the inverse relation between p and g* in Eq. (2), for given g.  With the same 
parameter values as before, (Yt)* is 24.0% below Yt.  Hence, when gauged by the 
compensating proportionate change in output, eliminating disaster risk is worth 15 times 
as much as eliminating normal economic fluctuations.   
  These large welfare costs of disasters arise even though the present analysis 
considers only the utility lost from reduced consumption.  For wars, natural disasters, and 
epidemics, an allowance for the direct utility losses from death, injury, and disease would 
raise the welfare effects.  See Hess (2003) for a discussion in the context of conflicts. 
  We can again modify the calculations to allow for a growth effect from a change 
in p; that is, for given g, g* falls with p in Eq. (2).  The revised formula for the welfare 
gain is 
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With the usual parameter values, (Yt)* is 32.5% below Yt.  This result is larger than 
before because the reduction in p raises g*.   24 
 
  We can also consider the elimination of all consumption uncertainty by setting 
σ=0 and p=0 (or b=0) simultaneously.  If g* is held fixed, (Yt)* is 25.4% below Yt.  
Allowing for the inverse relation between p and g*, the result is 33.9%.  These results 
correspond, as a good approximation, to the sum of the effects from setting σ=0 and p=0 
separately.  Thus, the main effects in each case come from setting p=0. 
 
III.  Sensitivity of the Welfare-Cost Estimates 
  The welfare estimates, including the effects from eliminating all disaster risk, 
depend on the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, and the IES, 1/θ.  Table 3 shows 
how the computed welfare effects depend on these preference parameters.  The line 
shown in bold, where γ=4 and θ=0.5, is the baseline specification already discussed. 
  The first four lines of Table 3 show the impact of raising θ, while holding fixed γ.  
One complication is that, for given ρ, changes in θ influence the effective rate of time 
preference, ρ*, given in Eq. (13).  The spirit of the calibration exercise was to choose ρ to 
generate a ρ* that produced reasonable levels of rates of return, including the risk-free 
rate.  To accord with this perspective, ρ is varied in the table each time θ or γ changes to 
maintain ρ* at its baseline value, 0.027.  For example, for γ=4, ρ=0.054 when θ=0.25, 
0.052 when θ=0.50, 0.048 when θ=1, and 0.027 when θ=4.  Since γ and ρ* are held fixed, 
the rates of return, r
e and r
f, and the price-dividend ratio, V, do not change as θ varies.  
For example, the equity premium remains fixed at 0.059 in these cases. 
  The general pattern in Table 3 is that an increase in θ—implying a decrease in the 
IES—lowers the welfare benefits from eliminating uncertainty.  However, for any given 
γ, since ρ* is held constant, an increase in θ—say from 0.25 to 4—has only a minor effect   25 
 
on the welfare gain from setting σ to zero.  (This result is apparent from Eq. [27] because, 
as an approximation, the benefit does not depend on θ, for given γ and V.)  For example, 
when γ=4, the welfare gain from setting σ=0 declines only slightly from 1.65% of output 
at θ=0.25 to 1.60% at θ=4.  The negative effect from raising θ on welfare is more 
pronounced for setting p=0.  For example, when γ=4, the benefit decreases from 24.7% 
of output at θ=0.25 to 22.6% at θ=1 and 17.3% at θ=4.  However, if we restrict attention 
to the range where θ<1, so that the IES>1, the changes in θ have relatively small 
consequences for the welfare effects. 
  Table 3 shows, not surprisingly, that decreases in the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, γ, reduce the welfare benefit from eliminating uncertainty.  These effects are 
more important than those from changing θ (given that ρ* is maintained at 0.027 in all 
cases).  For example, if θ is fixed at 0.50, the welfare benefit from setting σ=0 declines 
from 1.65% of output when γ=4 to 1.30% at γ=3.5, 1.12% at γ=3, and 0.74% at γ=1.  The 
corresponding gain from setting p=0 falls from 24.0% to 16.1%, 11.8%, and 4.6%.  Thus, 
the large estimated welfare gains from eliminating disaster risk depend on agents having 
a substantial degree of risk aversion. 
  A problem with the calculations for low values of γ is that the predicted equity 
premium deviates sharply from observed values of 4-6%.
15  Table 3 shows that the 
model’s predicted premium is 5.9% at γ=4, 3.9% at γ=3.5, 2.6% at γ=3, and only 0.3% at 
γ=1.  Hence, even with the presence of disaster risk, the predictions deviate sharply from 
observed equity premia unless γ is at least 3.5.  The model’s implications for welfare 
                                                 
15 Table 2 considers 11 countries with data on stock and bill returns back to 1880.  These data show a mean 
equity premium—excess of the real rate of return on stock (7.4%) over that on bills (1.0%)—of 6.4%.  
However, the stock returns refer to levered equity.  If the debt-equity ratio for corporations is around 0.5, 
the equity premium for unlevered equity would be about 4.3%.  Since the risk-free rate is likely somewhat 
lower than the average real bill return, the unlevered equity premium would be somewhat higher than 4.3%.   26 
 
costs of uncertainty likely should not be taken seriously in the range of values for γ where 
the model fails to get into the right ballpark for explaining the equity premium.  Thus, it 
seems best to focus on welfare effects corresponding to a value for γ of at least 3.5.  For 
this case, when θ=0.5, the welfare gain from setting p=0 is 16.1% of output. 
  It is possible to restore reasonable predictions for the equity premium at lower 
values of γ if the disaster probability, p, is raised substantially above 1.7% per year.  For 
example, at γ=3, p has to be 4.1% to generate the same equity premium, 5.9%, as in the 
baseline case.  With this unrealistically high p, the elimination of all disaster risk (setting 
p or b to zero) turns out to balance against a proportionate decline in output by 60%, well 
above the 24% calculated originally. 
 
IV.  Endogenous Labor Supply 
  The model can be extended to encompass a simple model of productive labor and 
labor-leisure choice.  Suppose that the output of each tree is given by  
 (30)    
α
t t t L A Y = , 
where At is exogenous productivity, Lt is the quantity of labor employed, and 0<α<1.  
The log of productivity is generated in the same way as output in the baseline Lucas-tree 
model; that is, log(At+1) follows the stochastic process given by the form of Eq. (1).  
Thus, the underlying uncertainty in this model is the same as in the original setting.  All 
labor is equally productive and earns the common real wage rate, wt.  Since the labor 
market is competitive, wt equals the marginal product of labor, determined from Eq. (30). 
  Each person is endowed with one unit of time, which can be allocated between 
leisure and market work.  Utility now depends on each period’s consumption, Ct, and   27 
 
leisure, 1- Lt.  One straightforward way to model preferences is to use the Epstein-Zin-
Weil formulation of utility from Eq. (10) but replace 
θ − 1
t C  by 
θ λ − −
1 ] ) 1 ( [ t t L C .
16  The new 
parameter λ>0 is the constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 
at a point in time.  This form is consistent with the King-Plosser-Rebelo (1988) 
prescription that preferences accord with the property that work effort, Lt, be constant in 
the long run; that is, when wt and Ct advance at the same rate due to steady productivity 
growth.  In the present setting, which lacks capital accumulation, this property also holds 
in the short run, so that Lt ends up constant in equilibrium. 
  The new set of first-order conditions involves substitution between leisure and 
consumption at each point in time: 
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Given the assumed form of the utility function, these conditions imply 
 (32)    Lt = 1 – λ·(Ct/wt), 
which can be viewed as a labor-supply function. 
  The production function in Eq. (30) and the condition Ct = Yt imply 
 (33)    Ct/wt = (1/α)·Lt. 
This result, in conjunction with Eq. (32), implies 
 (34)    Lt = α/(α+λ). 
Hence, the fraction of time worked is constant—invariant with shocks to productivity, At.  
This result applies because substitution effects (from changing wt) exactly offset income 
effects (associated with changing Ct). 
                                                 
16 The basic results go through with the more general specification 
θ ω
− ⋅
1 )] ( [ t t L C  , where the function ω 
satisfies ω(Lt)>0 and ω′(Lt)<0.   28 
 
 Since  Lt is constant, output and consumption, Yt = Ct, and dividends paid on 
equity claims are all proportional to At.  Therefore, the pricing of equity claims (and other 
claims) is the same as in the initial model. 
  Chetty (2006) shows, within an expected-utility setting, that labor-supply 
elasticities and the extent of leisure-consumption complementarity imply restrictions on 
the admissible range for the coefficient of relative risk aversion—the parameter γ in 
Eq. (10).  In particular, he argues that empirical estimates of income-compensated labor-
supply elasticities suggest γ<2.  Thus, he concludes that the expected-utility framework 
has to be abandoned to accommodate the higher values of γ needed to accord with 
observed behavior in asset and insurance markets.   
  The last finding fits with my results in the EZW framework.  The (consumption-
compensated) wage elasticity can be computed from Eq. (32) by taking a derivative with 
respect to wt, while holding fixed Ct, to get 
  (35)   compensated wage elasticity of labor supply = λ/α. 
Given the production-function parameter α, the compensated wage elasticity can be 
anything, depending on λ, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.  
Thus, in the EZW framework, labor-supply elasticities place no restriction on the 
permissible range for γ.  The EZW model, extended to incorporate labor-leisure choice, 
has three independent parameters:  one governing risk aversion (γ), another for the IES 
(θ), and a third for consumption-leisure substitution (λ). 
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V.  Endogenous Saving and Investment 
  In an endowment economy, agents do not react to changes in uncertainty by 
altering saving and investment.  Generally, the potential for such adjustments affects 
welfare costs—not at the margin (by the envelope theorem) but for large changes in 
parameters.  This section illustrates this process by using a version of the tractable AK 
model of endogenous saving and investment developed in Barro (2006, section VIII). 
  The quantity of trees is now variable and corresponds to the capital stock, Kt.  
Production of fruit is given by an AK production function: 
 ( 3 5 )      Y t = AKt. 
Unlike the original model, the productivity level, A>0, is now constant.  Output can be 
consumed as fruit, Ct, or invested as seed, It, so that 
 ( 3 6 )      C t = Yt - It = AKt - It. 
  The creation of new trees through planting seeds (that is, investment) is assumed 
to be rapid enough so that, as in the conventional one-sector production framework, the 
fruit price of trees (capital) is pegged at a price normalized to one.  This setting 
corresponds to “Tobin’s q” always equaling one—unlike in the previous model, where 
the market price of trees was variable. 
  The capital stock evolves because of gross investment and depreciation, δt+1Kt: 
 (37)    Kt+1 = Kt + It – δt+1Kt. 
The depreciation rate is stochastic and equal to 
 (38)    δt+1 = δ + ut+1 + vt+1, 
where 0<δ<1.  The ut+1 shock, normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ
2, 
represents normal fluctuations, as in the previous setting.  The vt+1 shock represents rare   30 
 
disasters, again as in the earlier model.  With probability 1-p, vt+1 = 0, and with 
probability p, vt+1 = -b; that is, the fraction b (0<b<1) of the trees is destroyed.  The 
analysis requires 0<δt+1<1.  This restriction holds with probability one as the length of the 
period approaches zero, assuming that σ
2 and p are proportional to the length of the 
period. 
  Since the market price of trees is pegged at one, the expected rate of return on 
equity shares is given immediately by 
 (39)    r
e = A – δ – p·Eb. 
Because the shocks, ut+1 and vt+1, are i.i.d. (permanent to the levels of capital stock and 
GDP), the ratio of gross investment (and gross saving) to the capital stock will be 
optimally chosen as a constant, denoted by ν.  One way to determine ν is to use the usual 
consumption-based asset-pricing formula for equity shares, combined with the condition 
that the price of these shares equals unity.   
  The saving ratio, ν, can be determined, as the length of the period approaches 
zero, to be 
   (40)    
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assuming γ≠1.  One point from Eq. (40) is that, if γ>0, the sign of the effect of 
uncertainty (σ, p, or the distribution of b) on the saving ratio, ν, depends on the IES, 1/θ, 
not the degree of risk aversion, γ.  Moreover, if θ<1—the case that we emphasized 
previously—so that the IES exceeds 1, the “substitution effect” dominates, and more 
uncertainty (higher σ or p or a shift of the b-distribution toward larger values) leads to a 
lower saving ratio, ν. 
  The expected growth rate of GDP and the capital stock is   31 
 
 (41)   Et(Kt+1/Kt – 1) = ν – δ – p·Eb. 
Therefore, a higher saving ratio, ν, in Eq. (40) implies a higher expected growth rate in 
Eq. (41). 
  The calibration of the endogenous-saving model can be matched to the 
endowment economy.  Thus, I use the baseline parameter values assumed before, 
including γ=4 and θ=0.5.  To get a full correspondence, the expected growth rate, given 
in Eq. (36), has to equal the value g*=0.020 used before (see Eq. [2]).  Equations (35) 
and (36) imply that the expected growth rate determines the parameter combination 
A-δ-ρ, which turns out to equal 0.024.  The formula for the risk-free rate in the 
endogenous-saving model
17 pins down the value of ρ needed to generate r
f=0.010, as 
before.  The result is ρ=0.052 (as in the baseline case for the endowment economy) and, 
hence, A-δ = 0.074.   The expected rate of return on equity, r
e, given by Eq. (34), then 
equals 0.069, the same as in the endowment economy.  Therefore, the equity premium, 
r
e - r
f = 0.059, is also the same as before.   
  Substitution of the various parameter values into Eq. (35) yields a gross saving 
ratio, ν, of 0.025 + δ.  (The parameters A and δ cannot be separated, but this limitation 
does not affect the welfare analysis.)  As an example, if δ=0.05, then ν=0.075.  That is, 
annual gross saving and investment equal 7.5% of the capital stock. 
  The new results on welfare costs apply to large changes; for example, setting σ=0 
or p=0.  We can, as before, express the results in terms of proportionate declines in initial 
GDP (and, in the present context, also the capital stock) that would be willingly 
exchanged for each kind of reduction in uncertainty.  These welfare effects in the 
endogenous-saving model coincide with those for the endowment economy if the gross 
                                                 
17The formula is r
f = A – δ – γσ
2 – p·[E(1-b)
-γ – E(1-b)
1-γ].     32 
 
saving ratio, ν, is constrained to remain fixed at its initial value (0.075).  Specifically, the 
offsetting proportionate reductions in GDP would be 1.65% for setting σ=0 and 32.5% 
for setting p=0.  (This effect for setting p=0 coincides with that for the endowment 
economy if the latter calculation includes the growth effect from reducing p in the 
formula for g* in Eq. [2]—see Eq. [29].)  In effect, with ν held fixed, the endogenous-
saving model operates like an endowment economy. 
  The results are different if the saving ratio, ν, is free to adjust to the changes in σ 
and p, in accordance with the optimal response given by Eq. (40).  Since the optimal 
saving response cannot make the situation worse, the compensating output variations for 
eliminating uncertainty must be at least as large as those in the endowment economy.
18  
For the calibration parameters already mentioned, the results are
19 
•  setting σ=0:  saving ratio, ν, rises from 0.0751 to 0.0759, welfare  
  effect = 1.65%; 
•  setting p=0:  ν rises from 0.0751 to 0.0924, welfare effect = 35.7%. 
  For the case where σ is set to zero, the impact of allowing for the small increase in 
the saving ratio (from 0.0751 to 0.0759) is trivial.  Hence, the welfare effect, 1.65%, is 
essentially the same as that for the endowment economy.
20  However, when considering 
p=0, the significant rise in the saving ratio (from 0.0751 to 0.0924) generates a detectable 
increase in the welfare effect:  the output that would be relinquished to eliminate disaster 
                                                 
18 If θ=1, ν does not depend on σ or p, and the results are the same as those as in the case where ν is 
constrained not to vary. 
19 The welfare calculations can be made from a formula that modifies Eq. (24): 
(Yt)*/Yt = (V/V*)
1/(1-θ) ·(A-ν)/(A-ν*).  The variables V and V* correspond to the price-dividend ratios 
determined in Eq. (14), except that g* is replaced by the expected growth rate given in Eq. (41).  The 
variables ν and ν* are investment ratios in the initial and hypothetical situations, as determined by Eq. (40). 
20Epaulard and Pommeret (2003) also modified the calculations of welfare costs of uncertainty to allow for 
adjustments of saving in an AK model.  However, because they excluded disaster risks, the quantitative 
significance of the saving adjustment was minor—as in the present case for setting σ=0.   33 
 
risk rises from 32.5% to 35.7%.  Note that we could instead start from σ=0 or p=0 and 
compute the proportionate increase in GDP required to compensate for an increase in σ 
or p.  In this case, the optimal adjustment of the saving ratio (downward) reduces the 
welfare effect in the sense of the compensating, proportionate increase in GDP. 
 
VI.  Concluding Observations 
  The baseline parameter value σ=0.02 per year represents the extent of business 
fluctuations during the tranquil post-World War II years in the United States and other 
OECD countries.  This period was calm for the OECD countries when considered in 
comparison to the first half of the 20
th century, a turbulent time that featured World 
Wars I and II and the Great Depression.  Hence, a reduction in σ amounts to making 
milder the business fluctuations that were already strikingly tame.  Not surprisingly, the 
benefit from this change—corresponding to around 1.5% of GDP each year—is only 
moderate, though still important. 
  In contrast, the probability parameter p and size parameter b refer to major 
economic disasters, such as those that occurred in many countries during World Wars I 
and II and the Great Depression.  Outside of the OECD, we can also think of p and b as 
relating to events such as the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the Latin-American 
debt crisis of the early 1980s, and the Argentine exchange-rate crisis of 2001-02.  A 
reduction in p amounts to lowering the chance of repeating these kinds of extreme events, 
and a fall in b amounts to decreasing the likely size of these events.  To go further, 
decreases in p or b constitute reductions in the probability or size of disasters not yet seen 
or, at least, not seen in the 20
th century.  Included here would be nuclear conflicts, large-  34 
 
scale natural disasters (tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, asteroid collisions), and 
epidemics of disease (Black Death, avian flu).  My estimates indicate that the welfare 
consequences from eliminating all uncertainty of this kind are large—roughly 15 times 
the effects for normal economic fluctuations.  Moreover, these large welfare effects from 
disasters arise even though the analysis considers only the utility losses from reduced 
consumption.  A broader analysis would include direct utility effects from changes in 
mortality and health. 
  Macroeconomic stabilization policies, including monetary policy, relate to both 
types of uncertainty—σ on the one hand and p or b on the other hand.  The policies may 
also affect the long-term expected growth rate, g*.  Well known is the success of OECD 
countries in achieving low and stable inflation since the mid-1980s.  This success is 
sometimes argued to have contributed to milder business fluctuations (lower σ) and 
perhaps to stronger average economic growth (higher g*).  However, commentaries on 
monetary policy frequently also stress the roles of central banks in exacerbating or 
moderating major economic crises.  For example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) blame 
the Federal Reserve for the severity of the Great Depression in the United States, as well 
as for the sharp recession of 1937-38.  Observers of Alan Greenspan’s tenure as Fed chair 
often focus on his role in apparently moderating the consequences of the global stock-
market crash of 1987 and the Long-Term Capital Management/Russian crisis of 1998.  
Difficulties in 2007 related to mortgage financing may be another such case—one that 
may make or break the reputations of Ben Bernanke and other central bankers.  The 
policy actions during these kinds of crises—if actually effective—have more to do with   35 
 
lowering p and b than decreasing σ.  A key, unresolved issue is whether and how a 
monetary authority can reduce the probability, p, and size, b, of economic collapses. 
 Another  possibility  is that moderating ordinary business fluctuations, represented 
by σ, has an indirect payoff in terms of reducing the probability, p, and size, b, of major 
contractions.  That is, preventing or lessening mild recessions may lower the chances of 
experiencing downturns that magnify into depressions.  This perspective would greatly 
amplify the rewards from ordinary stabilization policies, such as those practiced regularly 
by central bankers.  However, at this point, this idea is just a conjecture, well worth 
further investigation. 
  Governmental institutions and policies that are not directly related to 
macroeconomic stabilization can also affect disaster probabilities and sizes.  For 
example, the formation of the European Union and the adoption of the euro have often 
been analyzed as influences on the extent of business fluctuations (σ) and the average rate 
of economic growth (g*), sometimes focusing on the role of international trade in goods 
and assets.  However, from a political perspective, the main force behind the adoption of 
these institutions was likely the desire to avoid a repetition of World War II; that is, to 
reduce the disaster probability, p, applicable to war.  This perceived impact on disaster 
probability related to war is likely to be a key element in explaining why these 
institutions exist in Western Europe.  Of course, this perception may be inaccurate—
forcing Germany and France to share monetary, fiscal, and other policies may ultimately 
create more conflict than it eliminates.  Thus, an important research topic is the actual 
influence of various policies and institutions on the probability and size of disasters, 
including wars.   36 
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Table 1   
Parameters in Baseline Calibration Exercise 
  
Parameter Value 
p:  disaster probability (per year)  0.017 
b:  disaster size—uses historical frequency distribution  mean = 0.29 
g:  growth-rate parameter (per year)  0.025 
g*:  expected growth rate (per year), from Eq. (2)  0.020 
σ:  s.d. of normal growth-rate fluctuations (per year)  0.020 
γ:  coefficient of relative risk aversion  4 
θ:  reciprocal of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES)  0.5 
ρ:  rate of time preference (per year)  0.052 
ρ*:  effective rate of time preference (per year), from Eq. (13) 0.027   41 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Rates of Return for OECD Countries, 1880-2005 
 
  Mean real rates of return 
Country stocks  bills 
Australia  0.103 0.012 
Canada  0.077 0.016 
Denmark  0.074 0.030 
France  0.056 -0.011 
Germany  0.073 -0.018 
Italy  0.049 0.002 
Japan  0.093 0.004 
Norway  0.069 0.018 
Sweden  0.091 0.023 
U.K.  0.064 0.017 
U.S.  0.080 0.014 
Means 0.075  0.010 
 
 
 
Note:  Data on asset returns and consumer price indexes are from Global Financial Data, 
discussed in Taylor (2005).  Real rates of return are calculated from arithmetic annual 
returns during each year, based on nominal total return indexes and consumer price 
indexes.  In some cases, such as the United States before 1922, the data on bill returns are 
for commercial paper.  For some country-years, stock returns are based on stock-price 
indexes and estimates of dividend yields.  Periods for returns are 1880-2005, except for 
the following missing data.  Canada is missing stock returns for 1880-1915 and bill 
returns for 1880-1899.  Denmark is missing stock returns for 1880-1914.  France is 
missing stock returns for 1940-41.  Italy is missing stock returns for 1880-1905.  Japan is 
missing stock returns for 1880-1914 and bill returns for 1880-82.  Norway is missing 
stock returns for 1880-1914.  Sweden is missing stock returns for 1880-1901.  The table 
excludes countries that were missing data on asset returns during major crises—Austria, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands around World Wars I and II; Finland, New Zealand, 
Portugal, and Switzerland around World War I; and Spain during the Spanish Civil War. 
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Table 3 
Effects of Preference Parameters on Rates of Return and Welfare Costs 
          welfare  effects  (%) 
γ  θ  ρ  ρ* r
e r
f V σ=0 p=0 
4 .25 .054  .027 .069 .010 20.7  1.65  24.7 
4 .50 .052  .027 .069 .010 20.7  1.65  24.0 
4  1  .048  .027 .069 .010 20.7  1.64  22.6 
4  4  .027  .027 .069 .010 20.7  1.60  17.3 
3.5  .25 .062  .027 .074 .035 18.7  1.31  16.5 
3.5  .50 .059  .027 .074 .035 18.7  1.30  16.1 
3.5 1  .054  .027 .074 .035 18.7  1.30  15.5 
3.5 4  .022  .027 .074 .035 18.7  1.27  12.7 
3 .25 .063  .027 .074 .048 18.7  1.12  12.0 
3 .50 .060  .027 .074 .048 18.7  1.12  11.8 
3  1  .053  .027 .074 .048 18.7  1.12  11.5 
3  4  .014  .027 .074 .048 18.7  1.10  9.9 
1 .25 .041  .027 .047 .044 37.1  0.74  4.7 
1 .50 .036  .027 .047 .044 37.1  0.74  4.6 
1  1  .027  .027 .047 .044 37.1  0.74  4.6 
1  4  -.030 .027 .047 .044 37.1  0.73  4.3 
 
 
 
Note:  The baseline results are in bold.  γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and θ 
is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) in the formula for 
utility in Eq. (10).  ρ is the rate of time preference and ρ* is the effective rate of time 
preference, given in Eq. (13).  (ρ=ρ* holds when γ=θ.)  The formulas for the expected 
rate of return on equity, r
e, the risk-free rate, r
f, and the price-dividend ratio, V, are given 
in Eqs. (6), (7), and (5), respectively (with the replacement of ρ by ρ*).  The value ρ* is 
set at 0.027 to generate r
f =0.010 with the baseline parameters.  The value for ρ (0.052 in 
the baseline specification) is then varied in each case to maintain ρ*=0.027.  Since ρ* is 
held constant, the values for r
e, r
f, and V depend on γ but not on θ.  Each welfare effect 
gives the percentage reduction in initial output, 1-(Yt)*/Yt, that maintains attained utility 
while setting to zero either the standard deviation, σ, of normal economic fluctuations or 
the disaster probability, p.  The effects are for a given expected growth rate, g*, given in 
Eq. (2).  The values for 1-(Yt)*/Yt come from Eq. (24). 
 
 